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Summary :
The wide inequality in expenditure per pupil among school districts which con-
tributes to the problems with admissions tests and other costly social problems aris-
ing in the poorest districts, as well as the tax inequity among taxpayers with equal
ability-to-pay absorbing widely different" amounts in taxes, are both shown here to
be perpetuated by the narrow concepts of district wealth and tax efforts currently
in use. This article proposes a new and broader conceptualization of wealth and tax
effort that includes human capital wealth and financial wealth (i.e., permanent
salary income, net interest, dividends, and some capital gains). To combine income
and assets, a method is proposed of adding property to the capitalized income flow
and shown to be conceptually equivalent to the income flow method which converts
assets to an annuity. Simulations using these measures in Illinois, which is typical
of most states who plan to retain some scope for local initiative and support,
show that at each foundation level ($1,260, $1,500, and $1,600 to reflect the
state's real growth and inflation), the broader measures of wealth and effort, in
contrast to the narrower measures, bring the four lowest expenditure deciles up to
the foundation level within about four years. This much reform would constitute
a significant step toward greater equality of educational opportunity, equity in the
measurement of tax effort, and more equal protection of the laws.
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There is wide inequality in expenditures per child among school
districts within most states. The inevitable inequality in educational
opportunity that results has serious implications for the later lives
of tha pupils involved, and contributes to the later problems society
must face. But in addition to the excessive inequality on the expenditure
side there is also inequity on the tax side. Horizontal inequity exists,
defined as a situation where two taxpayers who have the same ability-to-
pay, as measured by their income and wealth, and who can live in different
school districts, pay widely different amounts in school taxes.
It is the theme of this paper that both the inequality in expenditure
per child and tax inequity are aggravated by a common key factors the
narrow definition of wealth based only on property wealth that is still
used in most states to measure both local ability-to-pay and local effort.
Broadening the measures of wealth and effort to include human capital
wealth (generating salary income) and financial wealth (generating interest
and dividend income) will be shown to reduce the inequality in the expen-
ditures per pupil, especially in the lowest expenditure deciles. The
primary social concern must be with the school districts where the expendi-
ture per pupil is in the lowest decile or quintile; there the problem is
the most serious with the interegenerational transmission of poverty and
with related costly social problems. The broader measures of wealth and
effort can also contribute to equity on the tax side.
It is further the theme of this paper that even if complete Independence
of expenditures per child from property wealth were achieved, there still
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would remain a dependence of expenditures per child on wealth in the form
of human and financial capital (i.e., on salary income, interest income*
dividend income, and capital gains). This fact, and the related failure
to measure effort on an equitable basis, could still be held by the courts
to be a denial of the equal protection of the laws.'2'
The reason that the narrow definition of wealth used in most state
aid systems causes the state aid to be less effective than it could be in
reducing the vast inequality in expenditure per child is that local tax
and expenditure behavior reflects citizen behavior. This in turn Is influ-
enced by total wealth (including income), not just property., Wealth in
Elizabethian times consisted almost exclusively of land and buildings,
but in modem industrialized societies other forms of capital and the
incomes they yield have become much more important. It is not surprising,
therefore, that studies in Illinois and elsewhere reveal that for each
given level of property wealth, higher income school districts tend to
levy higher property tax rates (J* Cronin, P. Hou, and W. Carson (1977,
p. 22)). This behavorial propensity is consistent with the heavy dependence
of variation in expenditures on per capita income among states and over
time found by W. McMahon (1970) * When these property tax rates are then
used as the (narrow) definition of effort, it misleadingly reveals the
richer districts to be exerting the greater effort, and hence in greater
need of state aid, while the poorer districts are shown to be exerting
the lower effort. This has led R. L* Johns (1976) for example to revise
his earlier more favorable opinion of "reward for effort" provisions in
state allocation systems. The problem is that the higher property tax rate
:
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triggers more state aid s so that among each set of districts with equal
property wealth* more aid flows to the higher income districts!
Qvet time, furthermore, in those districts in which income grows,
tax rates rise* triggering still more state aid, la districts with equal
assessed valuation* but lower income growth* the tax rates are relatively
lower so in these lower expenditure per pupil districts, less state aid
is received over time. Tn& rich get richer, and the poor get poorer
„
Broadening the measure of wealth and effort to capture the broader ability-
to-pay, while continuing to use property as the local tax handle (with
broadened circuit breakers to protect the few low income people living in
high income school districts) 9 will reduce this element of inequality.
The broadened measures of wealth and effort treat any two taxpayers living
in different districts with equal total wealth (broadly defined) equally*
With effort measured on a more equitable basis, the result is greater
horizontal equity.
A prototype model applicable to all states (except Hawaii where all
school expenditure is financed by the state) will be presented in Part X.
It illustrates the inequality in expenditure per pupil » the inflexibility
of the constants in most state aid formulas, and the effect of reform.
Part II defines the new measures of wealth and effort, focusing on the
conceptual basis for combining income and property into a single measure
of wealth. Part III considers the income data that has now become available
from the U. S. Bureau of the Census for all states* Part IV analyzes the
effects of the new measures of wealth and effort on educational equality and

tax equity, using data for Illinois. Illinois is typical of the problem
faced by all district power equalizer reward-for-effort states. Part V
summarises the conclusions.
I. A Conceptual Model
The prototype model applicable to most state aid systems useful for
analyzing the net effect of a given change in state aid criteria on the
inequality in expenditure per pupil is illustrated in Figure 1* This
model will be implemented later using specific state aid data.
Educational Inequality
The problem of the excessive inequality currently found in expenditure
per pupil among school districts is illustrated along the 45° line in
Figure 1. The improvement that it would be desirable to achieve is
illustrated by line WW. To establish the 45° base line, total current
expenditure per pupil in weighted average daily attendance (WADA) including
state aid as it is now calculated is first measured on both axes, so that
the inequality in current expenditures per pupil is displayed from point A
to point B. Current expenditure includes total current operating expenditure
from local sources plus state aid using the current real property based
measures of wealth and effort. WADA weights each elementary pupil in ADA
by 1.00, and each high school pupil by 1.25, to adjust for differences in
costs at the different levels e
There is currently vast inequity in the expenditure per pupil. It
ranges in Illinois for example froxa $632 per pupil per year for the lowest
group (of 5%) to $3,320 per pupil for the highest (Point B) . The range
.
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Figure 1
Effects of Reforming State Aid Programs
Expenditure $3*320
per Pupil
AB (AV & t ) $3 S G00
m (w & t.j
$2,000
$I S 500
$632
632 1,C500 2 s 000 3,000 3,320*
Expenditure per Pupil (using AV and t^)
is somewhat smaller from the lowest to the highest decile of districts .
This is a range of over 3 to II The system cries cut for reform*
This current expenditure per pupil includes state aid calculated using
Equation (1) which is shown below* It uses the districts operating tax rate
(t-) as the measure of effort (up to a maximum rate required for the
maximum entitlement) in the reward-fcr-effort part multiplied by the
Guaranteed Assessed Value per pupil (GAV) less the district *s actual as^-
sessed value per pupil (AV) typical of district power equaliser formulas,
2
or the "resource equalizer" as it is termed in Illinois.
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(1) State Aid (Included in line A3) *= t, [GAV - AV]
(2) State Aid (Included in line WW) « t„ [GAW - W]
fc, (AV)
(3) Where t« « —
With the broader measure of wealth (W) used in equation (2), the measure
of effort t n becomes the effective tax rate on total wealth* Effort,
under the broadened concept of wealth is defined in equation (3) as total
local tax receipts from school taxes (t^AV) relative to total ability**
to-pay (W). Since wealth (W) contains an income factor, the new measure
of effort automatically contains an income factor*
Expenditure per pupil using the broader measures of wealth and effort
to compute the state aid components % when measured on the vertical axis
(no change in what ia measured on the horizontal axis) is hypothesized
to be more equal after the change as shown by line WW. The reason for
this expectation is that for each given AY* the low income, low expendi-
ture per pupil districts will be revealed as having relatively lower
wealth (W) in relation to the guaranteed level, as well as higher effort
(t„) in relation to this lover wealth* both of which would operate to
entitle them to more state aid. It can he argued on efficiency grounds,
in addition to equity, that it is desirable that equalization should have
the largest effect on the expenditure per pupil in the lowest expenditure
districts, as shown* For the costs to society later cf sustaining unem-
ployable persons on welfare, as well as the costs of the criminal justice
system, the problems with college and professional school admissions, and
the problems with the interorganisation&i transmission of poverty, are
high and originate disproportionately in these districts,

The problem with inflation, as it gets built-in to assessed property
values (AV) , is that through £q« (1) it causes state-aid to diminish, and
automatically puts a larger burden on local property taxpayers. This
can be eliminated if the constant guaranteed wealth per child in the
formula (GW in Eq.(2)) d is re-expressed as a constant fraction of state-
wide wealth. State-wide wealth expressed in money terras will increase
with inflation, as well as with economic growth, and hence state-wide
ability-to-pay, The effect of doing this will be to cause line W and
its projected intercept on the vertical axis, to shift vertically up-
ward f especially in the portion to the left of the 45° line. If the
local contribution is a function of the local ability to pay* it only
seems reasonable that the state* s contribution to the common schools
should also take into account the effect of inflation and of economic
growth on the state's resources.
Tax Bauity
The third problem^ equity en the tax side 5 is addressed by broaden-
ing the measures of wealth and effort for the simple reason that wealth
that incorporates human capital and financial assets (i.e» 6 an income
factor) is a better measure of the true ability-to-pay than is a measure
of wealth that is limited to real property. All taxes go back to the
individual taxpayers ability-to-pay, who are basic to both the state*s
and the district 1 s fiscal capacity, irrespective of whether the tax
handle used is consumption (for state sales taxes) or real property (for
3property taxes) . Each school district has access to income through
the tax handle of real property. This is reflected in the fact that
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property tax rates are currently higher in the higher income districts
*
s situation which would not be changed by use of broader more equitable
measures of wealth and effort.
Although this addresses the matter of horizontal equity as between
two persons with equal wealth living in different districts » it does not
get at the problem of horizontal equity between two persons with equal
wealth within any given school district* For this* a broader tax circuit
breaker is needed. This would extend property tax exemptions to low in-
come persons living in higher income, higher property tax, school dis-
tricts » similar perhaps to the one used in Michigan* Although tax circuit
breakers are beyond the scope of this paper , their relevance to equity
within districts, as distinguished from equity among districts with which
this paper is concerned must be noted.
lie The Concept of Wealth as a Measure of Well-Being
There are basically two methods for combining net assets and current
income into a single measure of well-beings both of which result in a
measure of wealth that is superior to either taken alone. The first is
to convert the market value of assessed property into an income flow* or
annuity per period » which is added to current income to produce a more
comprehensive measure of well being* Y*» The second basic approach is
to obtain the present value of the current and expected income stream
from human capital and financial wealths which is added to the market
value of assessed property to obtain the present value of the total stock
of wealth, W* The crucial aspect ox this second process is the inclusion
of an estimate of expected future income. However under simplifying
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assumptions j the second measure will be shown to give assets and income
the same relative weights and hence to be equivalent to Y* for our purposes.
Income Flow* Y* t Including an Asset Factor
The first measure* obtained by converting assets into an income flow*
was originally suggested by Weisbroad and Hensea in their American Economic
Review article as a measure of the family J s economic position. It is:
(4) Y* « T + K. 3A.
t pt n n
where: Y current personal income*
pc
A * net assets, the se3 si used where assets are assessed
4
at 33% of market value*
R^ «* the annual rate Gf return on an n~-year annuity, the
present value of which is one dollar.
Using this as our first broadened measure of "wealth", assets valued
at market are conceived of as being used to purchase an annuity yielding a
flow of incremental income s the yield at rate E . This is added to current
income to obtain adjusted income Y*. It is not being suggested however
c
that assets should be, or are, so used* The objective instead is to develop
a conceptually correct method of combining the two into a single measure of
economic well being and hence of ability-to-pay.
To analyse the conversion factor R , there are two aspects to be
considered. The first is the rate of disccunt to be used, which is analogous
to the rate of return that a typical taxpayer could obtain on the assets if
they were invested. Consistent treatment seems to dictate the use of a
common discount rate, r s for all taxpayers. This rate ? it could be argued*
lies within a limited range of alternatives from 5% to 9%$ 5% being the
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rate on savings accounts in banks and savings and lean associations, and
9% being the average rate of return on common stocks* The rates of return
on certificates of deposit, government bonds s and insurance policies which
are purchased by many households fail within the 5-9% range. This is not
a serious problem, so we will merely be conservative and choose a 5% dis-
count rate, a common rate of return for many families and small businesses,
The second aspect of the conversion factor R involves selecting the
time period over which the annuity is to be computed, in principle any
time span from zero to infinity could be chosen, but it would be more
reasonable to convert assets to an annuity covering a time span equal to
the remaining lifetime of the average taxpaying unit in a school district e
The average age of persons 21 years old and over is 44 years of age*
according to the 0* 3. Bureau of the Census (1973, p. 32} s To treat all
school districts consistently, this will be taken as the average age of
adults in each school district. Since the life expectancy of a 44 year
old taxpayer is 2S years, as can be seen in Table 1, 28 years of life
remains as the time span over which the annuity is to be paid.
The asset conversion rate may now be computed using the formula
shown in Table i s for which the derivation is given in Appendix A. For
a life span of 28 years and a 5% discount rate, R is given in the last
n
column of Table 1 as *067« This will be the factor used to convert as-
sets to an income flow, for the first, broader ? measure of wealth.

Table I 8 Annuiti2&tion Rates (R ) For Different Life Expectancies
R e rfi - (l-fr) 1*" I See
n
l
Kumber of Years Asset Conversion Rate R **
Annuity to be Paid r^oOS ^=,08
33 .062 .087
(33) ,062 ,087
32 .063 ,087
3i .064 .088
30 .065 .089
29 .066 .090
28 .067 .090
27 s 063 ,091
26 .070 .092
(25) ,071 .094
25 .071 .094
24 .072 .095
23 .074 .096
22 .076 .098
21 .078 .100
*?or white xaales only. Source* Statistical Bureau of the Metropolitan Life
Insurance Goapany* Similar tables are available for feicaies and blacks, but
a single table provides consistency among districts.
**See W. Groggin (1974) for an earlier application of this to financial need
analysis.
Expectation of Life
Age in Years*
38 33.4
39 32.5
40 31,6
41 30,7
42 29.8
43 28,9
44 28.0
45 4.1 s/L
46 26,3
47 25,5
48 24,7
49 23,8
50
51 22.3
52 21.5
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Wealth, W, Including Human and Financial Capital
The second measure of wealth is constructed by adding current income,
the present value of expected income,} and property to obtain permanent
net worth, or wealth:
(5) W « Y + Y* + 3A„
t pt pt t
where
:
Y « current personal income from human capital and financial
? assets,
o
Y « the present value of expected future income from these,
A « net property* again multiplied by 3 where property is
appraised at 1/3 of market.
Expected future income, the new element, is really the capitalized value
of the current income stream. That is, it can be viewed as related to
current income in a simple way 3uch as:
(6) Y* = BY .
' pt pt'
where B is a capitalization rate* Substituting this into Eq. (5) for
Y .
, wealth becomespt'
(7) W„ - <1 + B)Y_ + 3A.
C pi. E,
If this is divided through by (1 + B) , the result is?
(8) (^W - Ypt + (-^S-V
This is similar to the definition of Y* in Eq« (4). That is, the two
new measures of wealth differ only hy the multiplicative factor 1/14-B. If
n 1+B * n
Miller and Hornseth (1967) have prepared for the Bureau of the Census
estimates of the present value of lifetime earnings based on cross-sectional
Census data for males by age, race, and educational level. These average
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iifetime earnings for each population subgroup can be expressed as a
ratio to the average annual current earnings within each subgroup to
obtain an estimate of B for each group. These estimates given in
Table 2 can be used to convert current income into estimates of the
present value of expected future income.
For taxpaying adults in the United States, whose average age is age
44, the ratios of expected earnings to current earnings is 14 , 2 for whites
and 12 • 5 for blacks * This is as shown in Table 2 in the row for age 44
and the coluisns for 12 years of education. Weighting these to reflect
the larger percentage of whites than blacks , the mean ratio of future to
current earnings is 13.9. This second measure of wealth as given by
£q. (5) therefore becomes?
(9) W
t
- (1+13.9)Y -f 3A
t
.
Dividing through by 14 « 9, this becomes:
(10) Y* - .067W. - Y . + .067 3A .
t t pt t
which is identical to the first measure of wealth in Eq. (4) S That is,
1
.067 * R * Tnr« K. and B have a reasonable relation to one another
n jl+3 n
in that R reflects the number of years over which the annuity is to be
paid, and B reflects the number of years over which income is to be summed,
or capitalized.
This result indicates that both of the new measures of wealth give
the same relative weight to income and assets. A second result is that
the "flow" measure, Y*, and the "stock" measure of wealth V? s differ only by
the multiplicative constant 14.9* Therefore only the "stock" measure of
wealth, W, need be used hereafter e
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Tabla 2. Ratios of the Present Value of Expected
Lifetiifte Earnings to Current Earnings
£
Y * BY where Y * earnings
«
Table assumes productivity increases of 1% and s discount rate of 5%,
B Satios
Age 8 Yrs. Education 12 Yrs< , Education 16 Yrs* Education
White Ncnwcite White Konvh.ite White Nonwhite
40 16.0 14.6 16,5 14,2 18,3 14.7
41 15.5 » /. ** 15.9 13.8 17.4 14,1
42 15.0 13o7 x5.2 13.3 16.5
43 14.5 13.3 14.7 12.9 15*7 13.0
44 13,9
13.4
12,8 14*2 12,5
12.0
14*8
14ci
12.5
45 13.7 12,1
46 12.8 1 "5 *}— -•- * i 13,1 11.5 13.3 11*6
4? 12.1 11*4 12.
&
11,1 12.6 11.1
48 11.6 11,0 12.0 10.7 11.9 10.6
49 11.1 10.4 11.5 10.2 11.2 10.1
50 10,6 9.8 10.9 9,7 10.5 9,6
Source. Miller and Hornseth (1967)
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Business Income
Personal money income within a school district does include business
income received by residents of the district but does not include either
the farm or unincorporated enterprise income sent to non-residents that
is earned on property located in the district. An. estimate could be made
of this business income by school district based on multiplying the as-
sessed valuation of business property within each school district by the
average rate of return on the relevant classes of business property* An
alternative would be to base estimates of business income on the special
county personal income data that is classified by place of .work , as now
published by the U. S. Department of Commerce (Technical Information
Service, Springfield > Virginia). But a reasonable case can be made for
not using a separate measure of business income when using personal in-
come in the new measure of wealth, For business property in the district
will continue to be taxed, and the business income received by residents
is included in personal income. Any further taxation of business income
of non-domestic business property located in the district is probably
better left to the state to tax, rather than local school districts,
anyway. So beyond this, we will not include business income in the broader
measure of wealth, although some may prefer to make a further recognition
of business property by giving heavier weight to property than is indicated
by Eq* (9).
HI. Data Sources
Data on equalised assessed valuations * operating tax rates s number
of weighted pupils in average daily attendance (WADA) » etc. have been
obtained from the Illinois Office of Education computer tape used for
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computing Annual State Aid 1976-77 (Copy library ESA7677) as originally
compiled by Martha Smith at the Illinois Office of Education, This tape
was also used to generate the amount each district pays in taxes, and,,
adding the state aid computed by the COBOL program, the amount spent per
pupil in each district, net of categorical aide
Since tr.any of the questions that hs^e arisen in the past about inclu-
sion of an incosrs factor in state aid formulas have had to do with the
income data, it is appropriate to focus in the remainder of this section
on the measurement of income.
The Income Data
Accurate income data by school districts for 1986 was developed by
Stollar and Boardmsn (1971) using individual income tax returns tabulated
by school districts by the use of zip codes* W« Mclure (1972, p* 79) has
illustrated for Illinois, using this data, the fact that income and
property wealth are distributed very differently,
The data on personal income analysed in this report are from the 1970
Census, as published in the 1970 Census: Illinois School District Profiles
by the Illinois Office of Education (1974)* These dsts cowe from the fourth
count tape of the 1970 Census as provided by the U« S* Bureau of the Census.
It is quite accurate for all but the very small districts with fewer than
300 pupils as has been pointed out by Fohlman (1974, p. vii). For these,
contiguous districts can be observed frosi the maps obtsined from the
Department of local Government Affairs ar\6 an average with the slightly
larger area computed.
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These data are updated to 1975, the base year used for both income
axxd equalised assessed values to generate 1975-76 state aid> by use of the
percent change in per capita income for the county in which each school
district is located. Total per capita Personal Income by Counties for all
states is published by the U« S. Department of Commerce in each April
issue of the Survey of Current Business (1977* p s 34). This is now standard
practice, so this information therefore will continue to be available for
annual adjustments to each school district in the nation frora this well
recognized source until 1980 Census data becomes available.
There is a significant new addition nationwide to the data on per-
sonal money income by township made by a new publication issued by the
U* S, Bureau of the Census (1977) that reports personal money income
for each township in the nation for 1S74. It is based on the township
information all taxpayers recorded on their 1974 Federal Income Tax return
for use by Revenue Sharing in IRS. Personal Honey Income is very close
to Personal Income*
To assign these per capita income data to school districts is possible
using the township maps available to locate each school district in
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relation to the appropriate township (s) in a way somewhat analogous to the
assignment of assessed valuation to school districts now done by County
Clerks.
The average per capita incomes in continuous homogeneous areas is
not likely to be drastically different * so omission of small tracts will
not have much effects Errors in assigning cities to the wrong school dis-
tricts can be avoided by use of the maps.
IV* Analysis of the Effects of Broadening the Measures
of Wealth and Effort
The broader measures of wealth and effort were first generated., and
compared, for each of the 1028 school districts in Illinois. The state
aid formula^ typical of variants used in district power equalising (DPS,
also percentage equalizing) states that provide for state sharing of
locally determined expenditures up to a point, was then applied using
each pair of wealth-*effort measures inserted in the computer program cur-
rently used by the Illinois Office of Education.
Total current expenditure per pupil in WADA then was computed for
each measure of wealth and effort, i.e., for
(1) Equalized Assessed Valuation (AV) and effort (t 1 ), exactly
as used currently
,
(2) Wealth (W) including the income factor, and effort (t
? ), as
above, and
t-AV
(3) Wealth as an income flow (Y*) s and effort (t.. * ~~r-).
That is, the locally financed amounts (t,AV> were added f but categorical
jL
aid and Federal aid were not* in order to obtain total current expenditure
per pupil "before" and "after" this one (paired) change ia the state aid
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forsrola* To allow for growth of the state average wealth per child due
both to real economic growth, and to inflation (that is 9 to allow for growth
in the constant ±n the formula) % this set of computations was first aade
for the current $i s 260 per child expenditure foundation level, then for
$1,500, and finally for a SI , 600 foundation level. The tables showing the
results for such & large number of districts are too voluminous to repro-
duce here.*"
The total axaount of state aid required by W and Y* was also computed
(and will be discussed) > the ratio of these to the total aid for the
entire state using AV and t
1
was computed * and the resulting multipliers
were used to force the aid total using W and Y* to equal that for AV$
thereby converting the aid using the new measures to the same scale as
AV. It is immediately apparent by inspection that the aid generated using
Y* and W is identical for each district. This serves as a checks and en-
ables the income flow ©assure of wealth Y* to be dropped from the discus-
sion. Wealthy W» (when normalized) is higher than AV in the huiaan capital
intensive districts, and AV is larger than W in the property-intensive
districts.
State Aid By School District
The state aid for each district assumes that!
1. Strayer-Haig districts , receiving only 1% of general state aid
in Illinois at present, c-nea having chosen the Resource Equalizer
(R) are not allowed to switch back. Currently districts are
allowed to choose Strayer-Haig, and a few do.
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2. The maximum increase of +25%/yr«, in the formula st present*
explains why aid often is the same irrespective of the measure
of wealth used when the foundation level is raised*
3* A new maximum decrease. of 20% of 1974-75 aid is inserted as a "hold-
harmless" type provision to phase cut the Strayer-Baig formula in
the calculation of aid and to phase in the new measure Gf wealth*
Phasing Out the Strayer-Haig Formula * To discuss the first and third
previsions above first* it is be noticed that upon switching to W, about
57% of the districts voluntarily switch in the first year from the Strayer-
Haig. The remaining Strayer-Hsig districts go to zero aid in five years
,
unless choice of the "resource equalizer'* is better for them* This is in
line with the recommendation of the Citizens Commission on School Finance
(1977, p. 16, 24)* However some "resource equaliser" (BPE) districts
using the new measure of wealth W also receive less aid*
The maximum 20% reduction operates as a hoid-harmless-type provision
that would minimize the impact of decreases, and give local higher income
districts time to increase their local support. But simultaneously, it
operates to treat Resource Equaliser and Strayer-Haig districts equally,
while phasing out the Strayer-Haig formula*
Raising the Foundation Level. Raising the foundation level first to
$1,500, then to $1,600 per pupil, while simultaneously going to the broader
measures of wealth (W) and effort (t.
?
) reduces the number of higher in-
come districts receiving decreases in their aid and makes the shift to an
income factor in wealth and effort more palatable. There is need to raise
the foundation level both because inflation has raised assessed values and

growth has raised per capita income since 1973 when the SI ,,260 foundation
level was enacted, yet Guaranteed Wealth per student is a constant in the
formula This constant in each computation acts to reduce the amount of
state aid required for full funding of the formula each yearl The best
way to get around this while leaving with local districts a degree of
responsibility for financing is to make Guaranteed Wealth per pupil a
function of the state* s growing wealth W expressed in current dollars.
The latter is simply the sum of the wealth of all school districts, so
no additional data collection is necessary.
Table 3. Guaranteed Wealth Per Pupil
^6-0Foundation !
AV
Foundation $1,500 Foundation $1»6GQ
AV W AV W
Elementary Districts $ 66,000
High School Districts 120 , 000
Unit Districts 43 , 000
78,947
142,857
51.724
1,644,556 $ 34,210
2,976,190 152,380
1.077,431 55,172
i,754 5 100
3,174,100
1,149,200
It can be noticed that at the higher foundation levels a few additional
districts switch over voluntarily from Strayar-Haig (S) to the Resource
Equalizer (R) formula* Cook 73 * for example, when the measure of wealth
was changed from AV to W would stay on Strayer-Halg. But when the founda-
tion level is raised, although with the old measure of wealth AV it would
stay on Strayer~Kaig, with the new measure W it would switch to the Resource
Equalizer. Other examples of this are Cook 94, and Peoria 328. Districts
receiving the Maximum 20% decrease in aid constitute only about 5% of the
total when the foundation level is raised ! Cook 299, the Chicago School
System, for example, would receive a decrease from $443,812,602 aid cur-
rently to $336,289,841 shifting to the new measure of wealth W at the old
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$1*260 foundation level but stays exactly the same at $443 s 812 , 602 if the
foundation level is raised at the same time. The adverse impact that
remains for 5% of the districts is largely confined to the regaining
Strayer-Halg districts who do not shift as that foraula Is phased out,
Releasing the Constraints on Changes in Aid, To observe the full
scope of the effect of switching to the new measure of wealths the very
important constraint that allows a raaxisuia increase in aid of only 25%
and a s&xiiaum decrease of 20% must be resaovacL The Adams 1 district %
for example, is at its 25% ceiling increase for 1976-77 irrespective of
any changes in the measure of wealth* or_ in the foundation levels VJhen
this constraint is resK>ved* and the foundation level increased to $1,600
its aid increases from $574,357 to $867*995 using AV and t+ and to
$1,049,208 using W and t.->* It would be best to phase in the $1,500
foundation level (using ¥ and t-) first , and then make the $1,500 level
a function of the growing state-wide average for money wealth for reasons
that will become apparent
.
Total State. Aid
Total state aid summed for all districts and calculated as at present
using Equalised Assessed Values (AY) as the measure of wealth, the operating
tax rate (t^) as the measure of effort* and the current $1,260 foundation
level is $1, 388, 038,298.
Switching to the new measure of wealth (W) and simultaneously raising
the foundation level to $1,600 with -f25% and -20% Maxixsms change constraints
increases the a tote-aid bill by «1% to $1 1 369.,66,9$ 235 . It is unrealistic
to consider the total aid using v? and t^ at the current $1,260 foundation
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level because it is a little less this the total, for aid using AY and t^
since some Strager~Haig districts receive less* and because an increase
in aid (by about $103,000,000) and in the foundation level (to $1,500 or
$1*600} is currently being contemplated. Aid via AV at the $i s 600 founda-
tion level is $1,422,971,677, 2.5% above the current level, It might be
better if these limits could be changed to -f33% and ~33%, for state aid
is only part of the total expenditures, and they have a very important
affect in keeping expenditures down in the low income districts.
When the -f-25% and -20% limits are released to see the full effect
of the changes to W and fcof total state aid iss
Table 4« Effects on lotal State Aid
IjSQQ Foundation Level i s $00 Foundation Level
% Increase % Increase
over 1977 over 1977
State Aid Actual State Aid Actual
Via AV and t. $2,034,427*442 46.6% 2,260,575,934 62.8%
Via W and. t
2 §1,910,612,449 37,5% 2,126*819,888 53.2%
This would onl}/ come about after several years had passed* During this
time rising prices and rising per capita incomes would reduce the amounts
required to below the levels shown above. It would be better if the con-
straints could be changed to +33% while shifting to W, t«, and a $i 9 500
foundation level with Guaranteed Wealth as of the end of this three year
transition period re-expressed as some constant percent of average current
dollar per capita income (Wealth) in the State of Illinois * instead of
appearing as a constant in the formula.
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Targating
In the short run* targeting state aid to the lowest expenditure per
pupil districts would dc the most to reduce the inequality of educational
opportunity* The greatest concern is with the lowest decile or qusrtiie
of the districts* As indicated above, these 3re apt to be the source
of many of the costly problem cases (e a g* ? for the welfare system^ the
courts j and for college admissions) * Targeting of state aid computed
via AV and via ¥* both at the $1*600 foundation level s is compared in
Table 5 below. Table 5 has half of the cases in the top expenditure
category, and spreads out the lower half for observations
Table 5. Targeting of State Aid
($l s260 Foundation Level, *25%-202 Increment Constraints Removed)
Expenditure State-Aid State-Aid Increment
Per Punil ABA via AV ADA via W in Aid
AV to W
~7ir~~ (2) (3)
0-§ 960 534 754
961- 1050 345 923
1051- 1090 713 1074
1091- 1133 551 1Q51
1134- 1186 629 915
1187- 1238 699 1039
1239- 1294 792 1008
1295- 1370 899 1038
1371- 1600 993 1023
1600 and up 1192 1060
Mean Aid 1040 1040
(4) (5
-f220 4
4-578 4
4-361 3
+500 7
-$-286 17
+340 43
-4-216 84
+139 128
+ 30 215
- 32 523
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It is clear that neither version targets the aid very well to where
the need is greatest, although W does better than AV* In fact aid using
AV as the measure of wealth and the operating tax rate as the measure of
effort gives larger amounts of aid to the higher expenditure per pupil
districts, as can be seen in Table 5, Column (2). This is a basic defi-
ciency in the formula (the absence of some floor level) that must be
looked into. However this short run (3-6 year) view ignores the incen-
tive effects on local effort of the reward-for-effcrt feature* The ICO
lowest expenditure districts are unique | very low AV per capita and yet
above average income per capita representing some untapped ability-to-pay.
The low expenditure per child districts are below the operating tax
rate maximum needed to guarantee the $1 9 600 foundation level of aid.
Currently only 20.4 percent of elementary districts (or 92 districts)
with 46.01% of ABA, and 4*05% of unit districts (or 18 districts) with
42.01% of ADA reach the full funding maximum operating tax rates in
1975-76 according to Dan Hou and Warren Carson (1977 s p* 29).
Whatever the problems * however, with this lack of a floor expendi-
ture level, it is clear that shifting to the broader measures of wealth
and effort does improve the targeting of aid to the lower expenditure
per pupil schools, and gives a needed incentive to a few high income, low
AV, low t, districts, Both operate to neutralise the regressive tar-
geting from use of assessed values that can be seen in Column (4) of
Table 5. '

Analyais of the Broadened Measure of Effort
A truer measure of effort is the total dollars of local taxes collected
expressed as a percentage of the best available measure of ability to pay s
i*e.
,8*. S- V*
t., Av
Effort * t« < ~~T ^ * the effective tax rate .
This is to be contrasted to the current measure or effort which iss
t,AV
"Effort" ** t- B - 1 ?,> " the operating tax rate,
i Av ****—• — —=— ~
Switching to the sew measures of effort does reveal that the lower per
capita income districts are in fact saking a larger effort in relation
to their ability-to-pay, ana the high income districts are making a lower
effort^ &s £&& be seen in Figure 1 below* Switching to the new measure of
effort would send more aid to the low inco-ae-per-taxpayer school districts
which also tend to have lower operating tax rates <, and hence receive less
&±d t staying below the foundation level*
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Figure 2, Effort
Effort
3*16
1.92
27?
Y/P»5,225 Income Fer Capita
t, * .000018 Y/£ + 1.92
x (.00001)
t„ » -.000117 Y/? -f 3.16
* (.00003)
2.37
F « 18.46
These districts that have the lower operating tas: rates and lower
income to the left in Figure 2 also have lower expenditures per child
as can be seen in the t, column in Table 6 below. They are currently
, 1 »«, , £ .
incorrectly said to be making less "effort*" and they get little aid.
They are however not isakiag less effort (except for the 4 lowest dis-
•!
-
i
-- - .... _CT
. - , ... -
*
tricts) when effort is measured in relation to their abllity-te-pay (W)
as their effective tax rate ! This can be seen in Column t. of Table 6,
and in th.<a top line t* in Figures 2 and 3*

sa-
lable 6. laadequats ?er PupII Expenditure a Fuac tion
of Low Operating Tax Sates But Not Low Effort
Exp. /Pupil in WADA
Via AV
-JL
^Tj260 Foundation
+25%-20% Limits Released
- $ 960
961 - 1060
1051 - 1090
1091 - 1133
1134 ~ 1186
1187 ~ 1238
1239 - 1294
12S5 - 1370
1371 - 1600
1600 h up
Mean
Operating
Tax Rate
1,24
1.22
1*42
1*46
1*68
1,89
1*99
2,06
2.11
2.027
Effective
Tax Sate
r
-2
£
JL« 2/ 4
2.02 ij
1,64 3
1,97
lc78 17
2*08 43
2.19 84
2.11 128
2,11 215
1.95 523
2,027
^O^" y»i=s*S-y t„ (Effort)
*«W«»a»&e
**» t- (Operating Tax
late
Expenditure Per Pupil
in WADA, Aid Via AV
Figure 3c Effort in Relation to Expenditure per Child
There are various ether ways of applying income weightings to the
operating tax rate as has be.zn discussed by Dan Ecu and Warren Carson
in J< Cronin, Hou, and Carson (197? * pp, 21-44) that could supplement
the switch froa the operating tax rate t, to the effective tax rate fc«,
Noting the problems above with the 78 expenditure-per-child districts,,
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still below the $l s 260 foundation level in Table 6 S a special income
weighting of the effective tax rate in the lowest decile to guarantee
a floor expenditure per child would appear to be a very important cue to
consider*
Analysis of the Effects on Educational Equality
Initial effects in the first year on greater equality of expenditure
per child trots, shifting to the broader measures of wealth (W) and effort
(t^) is negligible s largely beca.us& of the -f25%~20% increment limits.
However-, when these limits are released,, the full adjustment to the change
is revealed by the. shaded area and the line WS? in Figure 4.
Exp/Child in WADA
$2,200*
2 9 000§*-
1*800}*
l,600h
1,400h
1,200 1*
1,000
r
msv*
illllils^
l J&)
01*ft*)
800 I
a
4
If ajggg&Af fg ,. , \
€^a^W»^g-^e^aiaaaiaap^tf^vrwr- Tntg«ELacsa«nrt-'SM?--«i h am *=**&**>zxissix#*<&^^ aaw'^&tcyvrgwataagycaeg
SOO i.OQO 1,400 1,800 2,200 in WADA. Via AV and t,
Exp* Deciles by Bis-
^ Hxp, /Pupil
/
. i
tricts
Figure 4
Both the base line AB (using AV and t,) and the result., of the change
to W and t shown in line Wl in Figure 4 are both computed at the $l s 500
foundation level. The reduction in inequality in expenditure per pupil
due to the shift to the broader measures of wealth and effort, especially
in the lower expenditure per pupil ranges where the reform is needed most*
is considerable. The $1,600 foundation level shifts line AB to A ?B% and WW
to W'W* upward and to the right,

OU*
.Analysis ox, .the Effects or tax Equity
State aid based on equal effective tax, rates g t.>y asoag districts
at any given level of wealth W would be conducive to horizontal equity s
or equal crastmeat of equals* Districts with higher effective tax rates
at each « - .. th level could reduce thesa and districts with lower effective
tax rates (and tGore ability*-to~pay) at that level of wealth could lover
thes 5 they wis&sd to maintain non-wealth related differences based
only on recced in tastes. Except for these* the result would be
.-ticn. of equal ^oeal t&s collections in ail districts that have
as Eii?s.oured by W> which is horizontal equity in the
sly to ha vertical equity * however $ which is a
iwi
- t ;a&ttar on which co ieve agreements The regressive
: of 1 rty tax rates currently (expressed in relation to
. Ith that includes income) as suggested
e line t.? in Figs* 2 and 3 S would not be
to en ty as vertical equity. Some degree of
Lfcy, as would be introduced by additional* nonlinear income
1
-
- Ings of the lowest two docile?; would be more vertically equitable
proportional ccerifics or lainimuia sacrifice doctrines of taxation
theory,
Suss I £ Conclusions
:e of wealth and use of the effective
:*k rate causes relatively n^cre aid to flow to the lot? income school dis-
tricts w) In fact are now making the largest effort (t.y ) » It also targets
to the Xo^e expenditure per pupil districts which are a matter
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the greatest concern because of the costs later that society must bear
when education in these districts is inadequate*
Although full state funding would do the most to secure greater
equality in expenditure per pupil, the problem of decreasing the current
inequality within a system of shared state-local funding is likely to
remain the most pertinent one for the foreseeable future* The reason
typically cited is illustrated by the words of the Illinois Citizens
Commision on School Finance (1977 p* 14} that "substantial local control
of public schools should be retained B which means that a substantial
degree of local funding a ** (through use of) the property tax* * »must also
be retained* 3 ' Even if each school district in Illinois should go to a
local income tax, the same problems addressed in this paper of inequality
In expenditure and inequity among different districts will remain. How-
ever, to improve equity among taxpayers within each district, a broadened
circuit breaker that extends exemptions to low income families irrespec-
tive of age would be desirable,
A review of data sources establishes that accurate estimates of per-
sonal income per capita are available (except for a few districts of 300
pupils or less whose income can be ascertained by including them in a
somewhat larger contiguous area) , Income updatee can be calculated by use
of the data in the April issue of the Survey of Current Business which is
easily available to every school district* Per capita income data by
Townships haa also recently become available through the U»S* Bureau of
the Census (1977) from Internal Revenue Service sources* The data are
adequate* Anyone who really believes that the lack of annual income data
is the principal reason for opposing use of an income factor, in the words

of Sickrod and Hubbard, (1977, p» S) * "probably also believes in Santa
Glaus and the Tooth Fairy,"
It is best to not try to include business income because the net
income of unincorporated enterprises (proprietorships, partnerships
,
professional persons t farms) is included in personal income,
and business property is included in assessed assets* A correction for
any corporate income omitted could better be made by increasing income
tax on corporat.ions at the state level, a portion of which would be
returned to the schools through state aid.
It is also a conclusion that whether ''wealth" is measured as equalized
assessed valuation at market plus a capitalized value of the income stream
(W) s or as income plus the income flow that ccuid be purchased with the
market value of these same assets » is irrelevant* Either measure could
be chosen depending on which is the most politically convenient.
School aid policies and school district taxation policies can be
separated. The use of an income factor in the school aid formula as part
of the measure of well being or of effort can be considered wholly apart
from the question of whether school districts should or do have the
power to tax income.
Finally^ the wide inequality in expenditures per child among school
districts in Illinois, and the unacceptable implication for the society,
have been shown to be partly dependent on the narrow measures of wealth
and effort in use* By not changing the foundation level independently
of this reform* the switch to a new measure of wealth and effort, together
with an e£penditura~per~child floor , would become more attractive to all
the school districts in Illinois.
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There is a better opportunity to reform the inequality in expenditure
per child j especially the. situation that leaves expenditure in so many
districts below the foundation level * during this period of inflation-
induced reforms and Increasing state resources. The shift to broader
measures of wealth and efforts together with adjustment limits allowing
more rapid adjustment* will help to reduce the inequality in expenditures*
especially by bringing up the lowest deciles where the concerns of society
are most acute* while simultaneously improving tax equity.
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Appendix A
Derivation of the Asset Conversion Rate R
,
, a
Each dollar of assets can be used to purchase an income stream of
R costs per year (that is, be converted into an income stream at the asset
conversion rate of R percent) . If the income stream is to extend over
n r
n years, assuming the given rate of interest is rate r 9 its present value
is:
R R R R/•«>** n n n , . n
(i^ (1+r)2 <i+r) 3 ' (i+t ) n
Rearrange to obtain a finite geometric series inside the brackets:
(2) $1 - R [1 + (1-Hr)"*
1
+ <l-*-rr
2
+ ... 4 (i+rrG
"KL
l - R^ + R (1+r)
The geometric series may be replaced with its solution:
(3) $X - IL [
x r ftfr) .
. ] - & + a (l+r)~a
1 - (1-Hr) A
When (3) is solved for R :
a
i
(4) R *
~
, which simplifies to
Js «—^
—1 -f (Ifr)
1 - (1-Hr)
*"
N -l
(5) R *
x
,' (t
1**)
_
% which simplified is:
(6) R r [1 - (i+r)~n]~x , the asset conversion rate.
M/D/26
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that the
in oaxu-iB^ . ^ n .ble basis is a denial of tne equal£K£ rfSTl^iTtS Se of writing, the case is being appealed.
2. 11 wr4T»& -r Title I weighted WADA is usee in all aid
compu-
Actualiy IWAite* o uas x ^^-o" 1-^
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It is for this reason that the author
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Sole proprietors, partners, sto.Uio.de, s,
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finite lives, even though the corporation
as a legal entiry
hn Cook County, Illinois, for example* there are five
major classes
of property: 22%
t Farms and unimproved lane- .„„
li. keSiences and apartments with si*
or less units 22%
III. Large apartment builoings 30%
IV. Uot-for-profit ownership ^^
County Board in 1974 s at tne percentages
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column*
i * „«-. i^^eg^ -in detail in the source
'The methods of measurement are discussed
tt«MU *
cited, and therefore have been deiteo
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8
They are available however from the
author for §8 a set to cover
the costs of reproduction and mailing.
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These districts are labeled & cu
w &*.<*«-
foundation level in the separate Tables 3
and 4.
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